CVE-2026-115407: In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths…
Exploitation: Public exploit · CVSS 9.1 Critical · Unauthenticated · Published 2026-11-20
Description
In `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2` versions `<= 2.0.0-rc8` (and the deprecated v1 module paths `github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8`, `github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1` and `github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5`), the `cipher.AEAD` returned by `SecretKey.NewGCM()` passes whatever nonce it is given straight to `CK_GCM_PARAMS` without checking its length against `NonceSize()`, and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every `Seal` with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, `Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM` sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless `GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt` is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a `Seal` with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a `Seal` with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.
Fix
No fixed version in the CVE record yet. Follow the vendor advisory.
Affected versions
| Product | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Affected product | 0 through 2.0.0-rc8 | Not listed |
| Affected product | 0 through 1.6.8 | Not listed |
| Affected product | 0 through 1.7.0-rc1 | Not listed |
| Affected product | 0 through 1.2.5 | Not listed |